Abstract. Th is article focuses on the views held by the early Bulgarian representative and interpreter of pragmatism Ivan Sarailiev (1887-1969) on the two trends of this doctrine -the method for ascertaining meaning proposed by Charles Sanders Peirce, and the theory of truth propounded by William James. Sarailiev applied and propagated the pragmatist ideas of the doctrine's founders in Bulgaria in the 1920s, and is thus one of the fi rst followers of Peirce in Europe and the very fi rst in Eastern Europe. How deep was Sarailiev's understanding of the two types of pragmatism? How did they shape his philosophy and what was their role? Th is article will try to address these questions as well as presenting the overall reception of pragmatism in Bulgaria in the Interwar period through Sarailiev who was its only serious proponent both at the time and long aft erwards.
One of the general features of pragmatism is the opposition method for ascertaining meaning vs. theory of truth, or Peirce vs. James, which is an indispensable part of every survey of this doctrine, and is sometimes even chosen as a title (see Mounce 1997) . Th is split of pragmatism was further intensifi ed by the work of the followers of the doctrine who -joining one of these two traditions, and continuing their studies in the direction preliminarily set by it -actually pushed the two trends further apart.
Th e division of pragmatism is refl ected in an unusual manner in the philosophy of the early Bulgarian follower and interpreter of the doctrine, Ivan Sarailiev, as both trends have their own place and play a specifi c role in his philosophy. Th is article will pragmatism and contemporary American thought from the very beginning. In 1935 he founded and presided over the Philosophy Club in Sofi a, which was created in semblance to the Metaphysical Club, based in Cambridge, Massachusett s, that gave birth to the name and doctrine of pragmatism in the early 1870s. Ivan Sarailiev's prestige was recognized outside the borders of Bulgaria, too. He maintained contacts with his contemporary fellow philosophers, and took part in all major international conferences and congresses.
Sarailiev's work includes a number of articles and essays, as well as seven books, among them General Ideas (writt en in 1916 and published in 1919 because of World War I), On the Will (published in 1920, second expanded edition in 1924), Contemporary Science and Religion (1931) , Pragmatism (1938a Pragmatism ( , reprinted in 2002 and Socrates (1947) . He also translated Principles of Human Knowledge by George Berkeley into Bulgarian. Th is book was published in 1914. Th rough his lectures and publications Sarailiev introduced the ideas of Bergson and pragmatism in Bulgaria.
His book Pragmatism (1938a) deserves special att ention. Th is is a remarkable book in many respects. It is the fi rst presentation of the pragmatic doctrine in Eastern Europe. Th e book that consists of essays on the greatest pragmatists, such as Charles S. Peirce, William James, Ferdinand C. S. Schiller and John Dewey, is well writt en and readable. Th e introduction presents the reception of the doctrine in England, France, Germany and Italy, and the appendix off ers a survey of the history of the terms "pragmatism", "pragmatical", and "pragmaticism" and is followed by twenty pages of annotated bibliography. We will return to this book later when examining the question of the role the two pragmatisms played in the philosophy of Ivan Sarailiev.
When the communist regime took power in 1944, Sarailiev's career came to a violent halt. Th e new authority saw him as a bourgeois philosopher and a representative of the Western capitalist doctrines of Bergsonism and pragmatism. In June 1946 he was elected president of Sofi a University, but because of his refusal to cooperate with the communist authorities, he was compelled to resign some months later. Th e new governing body of Sofi a University off ered him the following deal: if he should accept the views held by the Communist Party and start teaching Marxism-Leninism, he would not be fi red in the impending political purge of the professors (CSA, 192) . However, being committ ed to the advantages of pragmatism, the philosopher steadfastly declined this off er and remained true to his views. In 1950, aft er a new series of att empts to break his will and "affi liate" him with the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the totalitarian power set its repressive machine in motion with the aim of removing him. Sarailiev was forced to retire and was banned from further publishing. Any access to his previous publications was prohibited and his name was classifi ed. He was saved from the labour camps only as a result of the respect his work commanded even among the communists (see Bankov 1945: 126) . Th e authorities forbade his students from visiting him, but he was awarded a consolation prize: every morning he found a bunch of fresh fl owers left by his students at the doorstep of his house (Apostolova 2004: 23) . Ivan Sarailiev died peacefully, but in total obscurity and isolation, in Sofi a in 1969.
The pragmatism of William James in the works of Ivan Sarailiev
Sarailiev devoted most of his lectures on pragmatism and contemporary American thought at Sofi a University to William James. Th e talk he gave at the Philosophy Club on January 31, 1936 was entitled "Pragmatism and truth". As the title clearly demonstrates, it was devoted to the pragmatist theory of James. What is more, in 1921 Sarailiev invited one of James' most energetic followers, the above-mentioned British pragmatist Ferdinand C. S. Schiller, to give a series of lectures on pragmatism in Sofi a. Although the visit did not in fact take place, the invitation itself is signifi cant. It is an indication that Sarailiev wanted to present to the Bulgarian scholarly community, above all, the pragmatism of James. Th is trend is illustrated also by Sarailiev's publications devoted to the newly formed doctrine. It is true that his book Pragmatism starts with the essay "Charles Peirce and his principle". However, it is followed by a logical transition: "Pragmatism is not simply a method for clarifying ideas, it is a theory of truth. Pragmatism is gaining recognition and will be recognized above all as a new and daring understanding of truth. " (Sarailiev 2002: 73) 1 -thus the author crosses over to the fi eld of William James, and stays there until the very end of the book. Sarailiev interprets the theory-of-truth aspect of the doctrine not as an isolated phenomenon, but in the context of James' other studies and above all his psychology. Th e book also contains a detailed analysis of the link between pragmatism and Th e Will to Believe, a book that is justly described as "the fi rst precursor of James' theory of truth" (Sarailiev 2002: 84) . Sarailiev defi nes Schiller's humanism and Dewey's instrumentalism as developments and corrections of certain aspects of the theory of James. Statements stressing the importance of pragmatism as a theory of truth are also found in the introduction and conclusion of Pragmatism (Sarailiev 2002: 20, 206) . 1 We will be using and quoting the second edition of Pragmatism (Sarailiev 2002) since it contains a number of original corrections added by Ivan Sarailiev himself to his own copy of the book. Translations from Bulgarian are by me -A. T.
Having acquainted the readers with the views of James, Schiller and Dewey, Sarailiev (2002: 206-207) sums up the pragmatist theory in six brief tenets: true ideas are useful; they are verifi able; they are satisfying; truth is changeable; it is the work of man; it is made up of the consequences the idea leads to. Th is is how pragmatism was presented in Bulgaria in the Interwar period, and in this very form it found a group of zealous critics, namely the followers of German philosophy (see, e.g., Torbov 1929 , Mihalchev 1939 . 2 Sarailiev himself knew that the most vehement criticism of pragmatism would come from the followers of German thought since he was aware of the incompatibility of the two traditions: "Th e inclination of the German philosophical mind to monism and absolutism does not predispose it to the perception of a doctrine [such as pragmatism] so impregnated with pluralism and radical empiricism" (Sarailiev 2002: 17) .
Bearing in mind the development of humanist thought in the fi rst half of the twentieth century, Sarailiev's decision to focus on the pragmatic theory of truth is far from surprising. When William James presented his pragmatism, he was already a world-famous scholar and a professor who presented and developed his views in front of thousands of students. Th is helped his doctrine win wide acclaim and many followers around the whole world. Th e career of Peirce, by contrast, was quite the opposite. Few were familiar with his ideas and his lack of experience with students was one factor in rendering his style cryptic and oft en incomprehensible. In a lett er to James dated March 20, 1910 Peirce (quoted in Fisch 1986 wrote: "Th ere is one way, were it open to me, my logic might fi nd its way to people's brains. Namely, if I could fi nd a class of young men […]". However, this never happened in the last 30 years of his life. Max Fisch (1986: 297) quotes a very keen observation made by Paul Carus at the Th ird International Philosophical Congress at Heidelberg in 1908: "Peirce is the only one pragmatist who can think scientifi cally and with logical precision. Th e others write like novelists rather than philosophers". Arguably, this is why the texts of the latt er were more accessible and gained popularity. In brief, James' ideas were widely propagated around the world, whereas Peirce's remained largely unknown. Th erefore wishing to present the most popular and up-to-date philosophical doctrine of the English-speaking world, Sarailiev made the logical choice of presenting the pragmatism of James. Th is, however, is no proof that he himself embraced it. In the conclusion of Pragmatism, Sarailiev (2002: 246) critically examines each of the six tenets and demonstrates, providing an extensive list of examples, that "the pragmatic theory of truth is true but within certain limits. It does not have universal validity". Sarailiev even implies that he might write a separate work advancing his own theory of truth which would do away with the 2 Tseko Torbov is the Bulgarian translator of Kant, while Dimitar Mihalchev is an ardent follower of the philosophy of Johannes Rehmke.
imperfections of the existing ones. Such a work, however, was never published, and is not among manuscripts preserved in the philosopher's archives.
The pragmatism of Peirce in the works of Ivan Sarailiev
Sarailiev's presentation of Peirce is more modest in volume in comparison with that of James. However, it is far more interesting and signifi cant.
It should be noted that Peirce's ideas, as opposed to pragmatism in general, were not widely known until the early 1970s. Aft er his death in 1914, there were a few occasional att empts to popularise his work, such as the appendix of Th e Meaning of Meaning (Ogden and Richards 1923) , the collection of Peirce's philosophical essays Chance, Love, and Logic (Cohen 1923) , and the fi rst six volumes of the Collected Papers of Charles Peirce (1931 Peirce ( -1958 . Th ese books, however, did not garner a great deal of interest even in academic circles and did not prompt any signifi cant secondary studies. In the early 1940s, in his lectures at the University of Chicago, Charles Morris promulgated Peirce's ideas, which was then largely followed by silence. Despite the fact that several monographs on Peirce appeared (Gallie 1952; Th ompson 1953) , in a 1959 Scientifi c American review, Ernest Nagel still referred to Peirce as a "litt le known American philosopher" (Nagel 1959) .
It is all the more remarkable, then, that Sarailiev introduced his students to the life and views of the founder of pragmatism in the very beginning of the 1920s. Peirce's fundamental essays were included in the list of recommended readings accompanying the course of lectures on pragmatism and contemporary American philosophy (CSA, 326). Later, in Sarailiev's book Pragmatism we can fi nd an essay entitled "Charles Peirce and his principle" in which Sarailiev quotes Th e Collected Papers of Charles Peirce -a fact quite astonishing, bearing in mind that Sarailiev's book was published in 1938 (and the manuscript was already fi nished in 1937). Th e fi rst six volumes of Collected Papers had just appeared from 1931 to 1935, and Sarailiev was already familiar with them in 1937. Th is edition of the Collected Papers (volumes 7 and 8 were published in 1958) still is the standard reference work today (although it may be replaced on completion of the chronological edition begun by the Peirce Edition Project in 1982). Moreover, an essay by Saraliev on Peirce was published even earlier in the Bulgarian journal School Review (1933) . At that time, when the name and work of Charles Peirce had been almost forgott en, Sarailiev appreciated the genius of his insights -the Bulgarian philosopher was then eff ectively ahead of today's massive interest in the founder of pragmatism and semiotics by more than three decades. Th is makes him one of the fi rst scholars in Europe, and perhaps even in the world, who comprehended Peirce's oeuvre.
Sarailiev justifi ably underscores Peirce's role as a founder of pragmatismauthor of the term as well as the principle of pragmatism (Sarailiev 2002: 23) . In presenting the method, he refers mainly to Peirce's 1878 essay "How to make our ideas clear", describing in detail the grades of clearness and the concept of thinking as a transition from doubt to belief. In this essay Peirce fi rst presented the logical principle which became known as the pragmatic maxim: "Consider what eff ects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Th en, our conception of these eff ects is the whole of our conception of the object" (W 3: 266). Sarailiev specifi cally emphasizes this maxim (the only text in the essay marked in italics), stressing its importance in understanding Peirce's ideas. He also gives special att ention to "Th e fi xation of belief " as an essay that complements "How to make our ideas clear". Sarailiev focuses on one more aspect: the intervention of James and its consequences, i.e. the splitt ing of pragmatism into two trends.
As already mentioned, James' pragmatist theory of truth was severely criticized in the publications of Bulgarian scholars. Against the backdrop of this vocal reaction, the silence from the same quarter that accompanied the presentation of Peirce's method is rather unusual. Th e reasons might be related to the fact that Sarailiev focused mainly on James' theory and thus all criticism was channeled in this direction. Or, perhaps the rest of the philosophers in Bulgaria at the time simply did not comprehend Peirce and were not ready to perceive his ideas even if presented in the most accessible manner and in their own language.
Peirce scholars today agree that his pragmatism is "a doctrine, connected with other doctrines in a system" (Fisch 1986: 269) . Th is system includes also Peirce's phaneroscopy (the doctrine of categories), fallibilism, evolutionary cosmology, abduction, conception of thinking, early cognitive theory and semiotics (or "semeiotic" -the term Peirce also used). Th ese doctrines form a network in which each idea is connected with the others.
Th e relation between pragmatism and semiotics is particularly important for the present study. In the original version of pragmatism (that of Peirce) the pragmatic maxim was a criterion for ascertaining meaning, and the sign, being part of the process of semeiosis, was a carrier of this meaning. Peirce himself em phasized, implicitly and sometimes even explicitly, the close relation between pragmatism and semiotics. One example here is his claim that all thought is in signs. Another illustration is the selfobservation Peirce shared in a draft of a lett er addressed to Victoria Lady Welby: "It has never been in my power to study anything […] except as a study of semeiotic" (Peirce 1977: 85-86) . Th e pragmatic principle att ains complete clarity only when analysed in the context of the theory of signs because "Peirce tries to describe the methods of pragmatism using the terms of the semiotic doctrine" (Mladenov 2004: 88) . Or, meta phorically speaking, Peirce's doctrine of signs is his pragmatism "vested" in semiotic terms.
Th is argument, however, is absent from Sarailiev's comments on Peirce. Th e pragmatic method was reduced to the maxim, which is in fact only the kernel of pragmatism. Th e remaining parts of the system were not directly introduced to the scholarly life of Bulgaria. Yet a large portion of them formed part of Sarailiev's own philosophical views. Without mentioning even once Peirce's ideas in his books General Ideas (1919), On the Will (1924), Contemporary Science and Religion (1931) and his philosophical diary published posthumously Meditationes (2005), Sarailiev developed ideas rather similar to those of the founder of pragmatism. His works demonstrate affi nities with Peirce's fallibilism, critical common-sensism, abduction, his conception of truth and even his evolutionary cosmology. Let us now cite a few short examples from Ivan Sarailiev's philosophy, as represented in these works, that illustrate this point. Sarailiev (2005: 66-67) claims that our knowledge of reality and ourselves is always incomplete, partial and fallible:
Can we think that today's understanding [of reality] is true? It is perfectly possible that in time a new theory shall be proposed and we shall start seeing today's as erroneous.
[…] Th is is how scientifi c knowledge moves forward, constantly striving to understand reality, constantly replacing certain explanations with new ones, scratching the surface of a reality, which in its hidden essence remains forever unknown.
Th e gnoseological system developed by Sarailiev leads to the conclusion that the search for absolute truth must persist and yet there is also a clear understanding that it can never be brought to an end. Th is conclusion coincides completely with the views of Peirce; the latt er was convinced that adequate knowledge is unatt ainable, so much so that he even relinquished the name "pragmatism" when James broadened his own method for ascertaining meaning into a theory of truth.
Incomplete and fallible knowledge is oft en not a hindrance in our everyday lives. It oft en turns out that a certain idea or theory might work well even if it is not true. What is more, on the basis of such ideas humans can "control" phenomena around them. Ivan Sarailiev's favorite example is electricity: there was no adequate theory for the nature of electricity for a very long time; yet this did not prevent humankind from using and managing it.
Sarailiev maintained that there were two opposing forces or two principles that created the world and determined its development, namely determination (necessity) and indetermination (chance, freedom). Absolute necessity and absolute freedom do not exist in any phenomenon. Th ey are a "boundary, approached yet never reached by reality" (Sarailiev 1924: 191) . Even matt er, which is usually perceived as the realm of determination, is pierced by a streak of freedom. Undoubtedly, at the macrocosmic level, matt er is determined. However, the atoms and electrons of which it consists move freely. What makes this possible is the fact that "macrophysical regularities do not suggest microphysical regularity; and microphysical irregularity can have a macrophysical regularity with a probability that may come very close to certainty bearing in mind the large number of individuals participating in macrophysical phenomena" (Sarailiev 1938b: 12) . From here on, Sarailiev's logic follows Berkeley: it is obvious that atoms and electrons have no consciousness. Th erefore, there must be another enormous consciousness external to them that causes this free movement. We all live within the thought of this consciousness. Th is is the thought of "a Creator who is a spirit and whose relationship to the world he has created is the same as the relationship between the artist and his work of art" (Sarailiev 1931: 20) . Th is is how Sarailiev reaches the idea of God. Or in the words of Peirce: "Accordingly, just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in body we ought to say that we are in thoughts and not that thoughts are in us" (W 2: 227, footnote 4). And, later: "Should every mind cease to think [an idea] for a while, for so long it ceases to exist. Its permanent existence is kept up by its being an idea in the mind of God" (W 2: 480).
When we put together all Sarailiev's claims concerning the role of determination and chance in the universe, we end up with the diagram of his model of the world (Figure 1) . Th e white section of the diagram above illustrates the role of chance, while the marked section indicates the role of determination. We can see the correlation between them in each phenomenon: thought, art, language, matt er, etc. Th ought comes closest to absolute freedom, followed by art, language, etc. Th e direction of development of the universe is from right to left , i.e. from absolute freedom/ chance to absolute necessity (the rightmost and left most sections of the diagram, respectively) because everything in the universe stems from the pure thought of the Creator. When Sarailiev discusses the lack of pure chance and pure determination, he refers to the middle section only. Human life occurs in this section. Th e other two stages make up the infi nite past and future, respectively.
Peirce defi nes the development of the universe in the same manner: "At any time, however, an element of pure chance survives and will remain until the world becomes an absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind is at last crystallized in the infi nitely distant future" (W 8: 110) . Simultaneously, the three stages of the Universe (see the diagram above) correspond largely to Peirce's "tychism", "synechism" and "agapism" (or "chance", "continuity" and "habit") .
Sarailiev maintains that people think in general ideas which are the smallest, integral part of our thought. Th ey are nothing more than mere hypotheses we use when approaching the world. "When I think", Sarailiev writes, "I feel a kind of vacillation" between two terms (Sarailiev 1919: 59) . Th e function of thought, according to him, is to surmount diffi culties. Th erefore, one of the terms must be the initial stage, the problem, which we are faced with, and the fi nal one -the surmounted diffi culty. Th e galvanization between them, i.e. the action of thought, stops, when the fi nal point is reached. Th e aim of thinking, then, is to lead us between these two points. Th e fi nal chord is an action, caused by thought, because for Sarailiev (1919: 75) "psychological and even cognitive processes are never cognitive only; we know in order to act; knowledge helps action". Although we are not in a position to overcome matt er, we are always in a situation that provokes thinking. Th e action, marking the end of a thought, is a potential beginning of another thought. Th e process of thinking never stops. Th is is just a version of Peirces's notion of "unlimited semiosis" (CP 1.339). Sarailiev's view on thinking is identical with Peirce's conception of thought in his essay How to make our ideas clear. Th e diff erence is merely termino logical. Peirce calls the starting point "doubt", and the fi nal one -"belief ": "[…] the action of thought is excited by the irritation of doubt, and ceases when belief is att ained". "Doubt" and "belief " mean respectively "the starting of any question, no matt er how small or how great, and the resolution of it" (W 3: 261). Sarailiev's proposition asserts that the most important part of the described process is the general idea/hypothesis that plays the role of a mediator between the two extremes. Th erefore the knowledge we att ain at the end of the thinking process is neither completely new, nor immediate, but is always determined by previous knowledge. Peirce reached the same conclusion: "No cognition not determined by a previous cognition, then, can be known. It does not exist […]" (W 2: 210).
Th ese are but a few of Sarailiev's ideas that prove very similar to the philosophy of Peirce. Th e forced discontinuation of the career of this Bulgarian scholar pro bably prevented him from collecting these ideas into a unifi ed doctrine. Th ey remain dispersed in his books yet their presence is a fact that allows us to call Sarailiev not only a promoter, but rather a representative, of pragmatism following Peirce's doctrine. Finding such an early promoter of Peirce is interesting; fi nding such an early fellow traveller of Peirce is really intriguing.
It is not only the historical value of Ivan Sarailiev's ideas that should be considered. For example, his pragmatic ideas on creation and reception of works of art can be used as an interpretative method in contemporary literary criticism (see Tashev 2012) , but this remains beyond the scope of the current article.
Conclusion with a transition to semiotics
From the above we can conclude that from Sarailiev's perspective the pragmatism of James and his followers boiled down to the six tenets cited above, whereas the original version of the doctrine appeared in Peirce's classic essay "How to make our ideas clear". Th e Bulgarian philosopher repeatedly stated that the theory of truth was more important with regard to the history of human thought. However, his own philosophical views seem to state otherwise. He did not appear to accept the Jamesian theory and his thoughts lead him to conclusions that coincided with those made by Peirce. Th is opens a whole new fi eld for contemporary humanities. Since Peirce's semiotics is similar to his pragmatism, then being a pragmatist Ivan Sarailiev was also a semiotician. Th erefore he lay the beginnings of semiotic thought in Bulgaria in the early 1920s -before Louis Hjelmslev, Juri Lotman, Roland Barthes and Umberto Eco, and opened a new chapter in the history of semiotics to be yet unfolded.
